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HLSummary of the argument,
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") 24(c) provides that only newly
raised matters in the opposition brief should be addressed and that a summary of
the argument is not necessary. However, Appellees have chosen to raise all new
issues, even to the assertion that this court has no jurisdiction to review the actions
of the lower court. This summary is therefore provided as a convenience to the
Court.
Appellees have argued that this court has no jurisdiction over this appeal
because Appellant American Pension Services, Inc. ("APS") was not a party
below. The fact that APS's participation was so restricted and belated that
Appellees can now make this argument demonstrates that due process was not
afforded below. As in Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc.,
2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782 (2007), Appellees/Plaintiffs have skillfully left the real
victim of their legal action out of the action until everything has been decided
against that victim, and are now using that as a club to attempt to prevent APS
from receiving a full opportunity to be heard.
The statute of limitations was raised at the only time it was possible to do so.
The fact that plaintiffs/Appellees now claim APS has not 'done enough' to
preserve the issue on appeal again illustrates that APS has not had a full and fair
opportunity to be heard.
Plaintiffs/Appellees' argument about the lower court satisfying the elements of
fraudulent transfer is both irrelevant and circular. The argument is irrelevant
because Appellant's argument is not that the judgment as written did not cover
every aspect of the statute under which plaintiffs were proceeding, it was that the
5

judgment could only do that by placing the burden of proof on APS, which is an
error of law. The argument of Appellees is circular because it uses the "findings"
to prove that the "findings" are proper. That is an error of logic.
Judgments may be collected only from property that is owned, legally or
equitably, by a judgment debtor. Whether plaintiffs followed the format of the
collection statute is not at issue. Plaintiff/Appellees' argument that the paperwork
was correct under URCP 64E is therefore irrelevant. The issue is whether APS, as
the entity that owned the property, was given a full measure of due process, i.e., an
opportunity to know what the issues were, and present evidence and law that
protected its interests. APS was not given such an opportunity.
Plaintiff/Appellees' last argument is that they should be awarded attorney fees
on appeal. The basis for that request is a statute that requires employees to "bring
suit" for wages. If Appellees had brought a civil action against APS, this appeal
would not exist. Appellees have acknowledged that they have not sued APS and
APS was not a party below. Therefore, the request for attorney fees is
inappropriate.

IV.

Argument,
1. The 2005 and 2007 Utah Supreme Court Cases of BYU v.
Tremco. provide the principals that govern this case, but
jurisdiction does not put the lower court's action beyond review.
Appellees have argued that this court has no jurisdiction over this appeal

because Appellant American Pension Services, Inc. ("APS") was not a party
below. The fact that APS's participation was so restricted and belated that
Appellees can now make this argument demonstrates that due process was not
afforded below.
6

Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d
782 (2007) is cited in Appellees in their brief. Its earlier iteration under the same
name, at 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678 (2005) is the basis for Appellees' argument
that this appeal should be dismissed. In Tremco I, the Utah Supreme Court held:
549 The appeal of the supplemental order filed by SoftSolutions and
the Duncan individuals and entities appears to raise tenable claims.
We lack jurisdiction, however, to address SoftSolutions' claims on the
merits because SoftSolutions' appeal was filed prior to a final
disposition of the postjudgment motions related to the supplemental
order, and we also lack jurisdiction over the Duncan individuals and
entities' appeal of the supplemental order because they are not parties
to these proceedings.
The last half of the last sentence of that paragraph facially supports Apellees'
contention that persons not parties to an action are without the jurisdiction of this
court, however, one of the key aspects of Tremco I is not present here, i.e., a
pending motion to intervene. In footnote 8 of that decision, the Supreme Court
specifically stated that decision of that motion would supply the jurisdiction
needed. The subsequent case was brought just as the Tremco I decision
foreshadowed. If this appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, such a
dismissal should also make it clear that APS is entitled to a full judicial proceeding
in the lower court.
As with plaintiffs in the Tremco cases, Appellees/Plaintiffs here have skillfully
left the real victim of their legal action out of the action until everything has been
decided against that victim, and are now using that as a club to attempt to prevent
APS from receiving a full opportunity to be heard.
This is clearly set forth in the opinion in Tremco II {Brigham Young University
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782 (2007)) as follows:
7

5J1 In this appeal, we review and reject Brigham Young University's
latest attempt to satisfy a money judgment from persons and entities
other than its judgment debtor, SoftSolutions, Inc. (SoftSolutions). In
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,
110P.3d678. we held that Brigham Young University (BYU) could
not summarily extend liability to Tremco Consultants, Inc. (Tremco)
for its SoftSolutions judgment. Today, we reject BYU's attempt to
collect the SoftSolutions judgment from the officers and directors of
SoftSolutions and related entities that we will collectively refer to as
"Duncan et al." We hold that BYU could not pursue Duncan et al. for
SoftSolutions' debt using only post judgment collection procedures
because those procedures did not afford those individuals a
constitutionally permissible degree of due process of law.

5J3 In the early 1980s, BYU developed a software product which
used an algorithm called "D-Search." The strength of the software was
its indexing and information retrieval capabilities, which could be
used to improve database applications. Between 1987 and 1990, BYU
entered into a series of licensing agreements with SoftSolutions that
allowed SoftSolutions to use BYU's D-Search software technology in
exchange for royalty payments.
5J4 In 1992, SoftSolutions transferred the licensed technology to its
wholly owned subsidiary, SoftSolutions Technology Corporation
(STC). Thereafter, SoftSolutions was dissolved by the state of Utah
for failing to file an annual report. Two years later, WordPerfect
acquired the STC stock. The shareholders of STC were three limited
liability companies, KWD Associates, AST Associates, and Julee
Associates, which collectively received approximately $13.5 million
from WordPerfect in exchange for the STC stock.
55 Prior to its purchase of the STC stock, WordPerfect knew of
and wished to be insulated from a simmering royalty dispute between
SoftSolutions and BYU over the D-Search software. However, before
the stock sale took place, Tremco signed an indemnification
agreement with STC. Under its terms, Tremco agreed to pay for any
obligations that SoftSolutions might incur from the SoftSolutionsBYU royalty dispute.
8

5J6 In 1995, after SoftSolutions had dissolved and WordPerfect had
purchased the STC stock, an arbitrator awarded BYU $1,672,467 in
its royalty dispute with SoftSolutions. The parties charged with
wrapping up the affairs of SoftSolutions challenged the arbitrator's
decision. The district court confirmed the arbitration award; and on
appeal, we affirmed the damages portion of the district court's ruling.
SoftSolutions Jnc. v. Brigham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d
1095.
57 With its SoftSolutions judgment in hand, BYU turned its
attention to collecting it. BYU pursued the collection procedures
available to judgment creditors under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. BYU discovered that SoftSolutions had no assets.
Therefore, BYU sued Tremco to establish Tremco's liability under the
indemnification agreement. At BYU's behest, the district court
consolidated BYU's collection action against SoftSolutions with the
Tremco litigation.
3J8 The consolidation of these actions created an unusual hybrid
court creature: part collection action and part traditional civil action
against Tremco. SoftSolutions had seen its day in court to defend
against the merits of BYU's claims come and go. It appeared in the
district court solely as a judgment debtor.(fnl) SoftSolutions appeared
in this status disarmed with most of the due process protections it had
possessed before BYU acquired the judgment against it.
5J9 By contrast, Tremco was fully armed with due process rights,
which it tried to use without success to turn away BYU's claims. The
district court granted BYU's motion for summary judgment against
Tremco, resulting in the entry of an order dated June 13, 2002. The
order included the court's determination that Tremco was liable to pay
the 1998 SoftSolutions judgment. In reaching this result, the district
court embraced each of BYU's four theories: (1) that Tremco, STC,
and SoftSolutions had carried on a common, joint business as an
association under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d); (2) that Tremco
was liable to BYU for the judgment against SoftSolutions because
Tremco had entered into an indemnity agreement with STC and BYU
was a third-party beneficiary of that agreement; (3) that Tremco aided
a fraudulent transfer of SoftSolutions assets to STC; and (4) that

9

Tremco was in privity with SoftSolutions and was therefore liable for
the SoftSolutions judgment under the doctrine of res judicata.
$10 Contemporaneously with its quest for summary judgment
against Tremco in the civil action, BYU sought an order in
supplemental proceedings in its collection action pursuant to the
version of rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure then in
effect.(fn2) Rule 69 governed the collection procedures, principally
the procedures for executing on property of a judgment debtor,
available to a judgment creditor.
5J11 BYU claimed that using its legal theories as the rationale and
rule 69 as the vehicle, it was entitled to execute against the property of
Duncan et al. to satisfy the SoftSolutions judgment. BYU brought
back the rule 17(d) business association theory that it deployed against
Tremco and coupled it with new theories. First, it utilized Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10a- 1408 (prohibiting distribution of assets to shareholders
of a dissolved corporation until corporate debts are paid); second, it
relied on two of our cases: Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491 (Utah
1996), and Steenblik v. Litchfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), for the
proposition that corporate officers are personally liable for the
obligations of dissolved or suspended corporations. It then sought to
advance its theory with the aid of rule 69(s), which authorized
execution against the property of a judgment debtor that was in the
possession of someone else.
3J12 The district court was persuaded that BYU's theories had
merit and entered a supplemental order dated July 10,2002, (July
2002 supplemental order), extending liability for the SoftSolutions
judgment to Duncan et al. as "associates of the unincorporated
association." The district court also found Duncan et al. to have
received proceeds from the sale of the STC stock. It adopted BYUfs
view that SoftSolutions continued to "own" the software throughout
its odyssey through STC, the WordPerfect purchase of that stock, and
the distribution of the sale proceeds among Duncan et al.
513 After the district court entered the July 2002 supplemental
order, SoftSolutions and Duncan et al. each filed post-judgment
motions seeking to vacate, alter, and/or amend the supplemental order.
Duncan et al., which found themselves facing an execution on their
assets, despite having never been joined as parties, also moved to
10

intervene. In July 2003, the district court held a hearing on these
motions. The district court orally denied each motion, noting that the
collection procedures pursued by BYU did not offend Duncan et al.'s
rights to due process of law. The district court did not reduce its oral
ruling to a written order until August 2004, well after the appeal was
underway that resulted in our Tremco decision in May 2005.
5J14 Testing the reach of the July 2002 supplemental order, BYU
obtained writs of execution on two parcels of real property situated in
Wasatch County, Utah. One of these parcels was held in the name of
Rannoch, L.L.C., while Carie, L.L.C. held the second property. BYU
asserted that these properties were traceable to Duncan et al. because
they were purchased by KWD-a former shareholder of STC and
beneficiary of the stock sale to WordPerfect that was controlled by
Duncan et al.-with WordPerfect proceeds and then were transferred
to Rannoch and Carie respectively without consideration.
5J15 In Tremco, we held that none of BYU's four theories could
lawfully extend liability for the SoftSolutions judgment to Tremco.
Consequently, we reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment against Tremco and vacated the June 13, 2002 order. We
declined, however, to reach the challenges to the district court's
imposition of liability on Duncan et al. because they were not named
parties in any action before the district court, and we therefore did not
acquire jurisdiction to take up their appeal. Tremco, 2005 UT 19,5JJ
45-49. Moreover, we determined that we lacked jurisdiction to
consider whether the district court erred when it denied Duncan et al.'s
motion to intervene because that ruling had yet to be memorialized in
a written order.
516 In the aftermath of Tremco, BYU continued to assert its right
to execute on the assets of Duncan et al., including the Wasatch
County properties because the July 2002 supplemental order
continued in force with respect to those persons and entities. Duncan
et al. have now properly invoked our jurisdiction under Utah Code
section 78-2-2(3)(j) by appealing the district court's August 2004
orders to deny their motions to intervene; to stay supplemental
proceedings; and to vacate, alter, and/or amend the July 2002
supplemental order and all rulings prior thereto.
ANALYSIS
11

I. THE DENIAL OF DUNCAN ET AL.'S MOTION TO
INTERVENE

5119 Despite its subordinate role in our ruling, we hold that the
district court exceeded its discretion when it rejected Duncan et al.'s
motion to intervene. The district court misapplied the intervention
standards set out in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 because the
inability of Duncan et al. to participate as a party contributed
materially to the unconstitutional deprivation of Duncan et al.'s right
to due process of law. As we will discuss shortly, the deprivation of
Duncan et al.'s property occurred in the July 2002 supplemental order,
and any later participation could not rectify a lack of earlier
involvement.
5J20 While we stand by the proposition that issues related to the
application of rule 24 are distinct from those raised by the July 2002
supplemental order (and the ruling denying Duncan et al.'s motion to
vacate, alter, and/or amend that order), the due process deprivations
visited upon Duncan et al. by the supplemental order infected the
district court's ruling on intervention. We therefore find little to be
gained by remanding this matter to the district court with instructions
to allow Duncan et al. to intervene in a proceeding that we have, in the
course of reaching our holding on intervention, determined to be an
unconstitutional violation of due process.
II. THE JULY 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER IS VACATED

5J23 Every motion to vacate, alter, and/or amend a judgment
brought under rule 59 asks a court to undo its work, an invitation that
no judge greets with enthusiasm. One commentator has aptly
described a party bringing a rule 59 motion as a supplicant who has
"hat-in-hand and heart-in-throat when he or she argues a post-trial
motion." H. James Clegg, Post-Trial Motions, 8 Utah B.J. 48,48
(November 1995). This apprehension is well-founded. As our court of
appeals has observed, "[o]nce the judge has decided, the system
assumes he or she has decided correctly and would decide the same
12

way again." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc.. 761
P.2d 42. 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
5124 We are therefore unpersuaded that the July 2003 hearing on
the rule 59 motion restored to Duncan et al. any meaningful measure
of the due process that they had been denied by being foreclosed from
participating in the events that led to the entry of the July 2002
supplemental order. This supplemental order is, therefore, the order to
which we will direct our attention in evaluating the due process claims
of Duncan et al.
III. DUNCAN ET AL. WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
PRIOR TO THE JULY 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
5J25 BYU urges us to turn away the challenge to the district court's
denial of the rule 59 motion because Duncan et al. have failed to
marshal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the factual findings
set out in the district court's ruling denying the rule 59 motion or the
July 2002 supplemental order were clearly erroneous. This emphasis
is misplaced. Our assessment of whether Duncan et al. were denied
due process in these proceedings has little to do with the factual
findings made by the district court or the merits of B YU's legal
theories. Instead, our focus is directed to what process was due
Duncan et al. before liability could attach to them under each of
BYU's theories. The district court's factual findings are at most
incidental to this task. In this instance, the issue of whether Duncan et
al. were afforded adequate due process is a question of law which we
will explore without extending deference to the district court.
"[I]ssues, including . . . due process, are questions of law which we
review for correctness." D.A. v. State (State ex rel. S.A.). 2001 UT
App 307,5 8, 37 P.3d 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also State v. Holland. 921P.2d430.433 (Utah 1996) ("[T]he ultimate
question of whether the trial court strictly complied with
constitutional and procedural requirements . . . is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness.").
5f26 Moreover, the July 2002 supplemental order was granted
summarily. The district court found that
[n]o opposition to the motion was made by anyone on behalf of
SoftSolutions, Inc. and therefore the dispositive facts set forth in
13

B YU's memoranda in support of the motion are deemed admitted
pursuant to Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration and/or pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
To the extent that our nondeferential due process analysis requires us
to review the facts, we will do so guided by our standards for
reviewing appeals from summary judgment and indulge inferences
emanating from the facts in a manner favorable to Duncan et al. Spor
v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987).
5J27 In Tremco, 2005 UT 19, 110P.3d678.. we expressed "serious
concerns" over whether the July 2002 supplemental order that
authorized BYU to execute against the property of Duncan et al.
satisfied the requirements of due process of law. Owing to
jurisdictional impediments, we did not explore the grounds for our
concern in that appeal. With jurisdiction no longer an issue, we now
examine those concerns and find them to have been well-founded.
Duncan et al. were denied their requisite measure of due process of
law when the district court extended liability to them for the
SoftSolutions judgment under the provisions of the July 2002
supplemental order.
528 No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society
that claims allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a
person may not be deprived of his property without first being
afforded due process of law. This guarantee is enshrined in both the
United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. That due process of law is
owed in every instance is a self-evident proposition. Measuring the
amount of process that is due in any particular setting is more
difficult. Nevertheless," [w]e long ago succinctly summarized the
fundamental features of due process, observing that it requires
that notice be given to the person whose rights are to be affected.
It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial." Pangea Techs.. Inc. v. Internet
Promotions. Inc.. 2004 UT 40, J 8,94 P.3d 257 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The bare essentials of due process thus mandate
adequate notice to those with an interest in the matter and an
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opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner. See
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, JJ 68, 100 P.3d 1177.
5J29 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure owe their existence to
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. They "[are]
designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the
parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon.11 Gillett v. Price,
2006 UT 24,3f 13,135 P.3d 861 (brackets in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Our rules of civil procedure lend
operational expression to the abstract constitutional promise of
due process. To those who pursue civil actions in conformity with
the rules of civil procedure, we extend the right to invoke the
coercive power of the state to seize property or to command a
party to conform its conduct to the court's decrees.
530 The same process is not, however, due everyone who
comes before the court. A judgment debtor appears in court
having consumed his ration of due process and with his property
exposed in summary proceedings. Accordingly, our due process
analysis must begin by determining what process was due Duncan
et al. The due process issue presented to us and our analysis of it
rest on a framework of two procedural facts. First, Duncan et al.
were not named parties in any of the iterations of this case, not the
original action BYU brought against SoftSolutions, not the lawsuit
BYU brought against Tremco, and not in the litigation's final
consolidated formulation. Second, nowhere in the vastness of the
record of these cases does BYU state a cause of action against any
of the Duncan individuals or entities. Rather BYU presumes that
Duncan et al. merely stand in the shoes of the true judgment
debtor—SoftSolutions. Nevertheless, Duncan et al. face the coerced
deprivation of property which they claim to be theirs, not
SoftSolutions, without ever having a civil action brought against
them.
5J31 In most instances, the guarantee of due process prohibits
the enforcement of a money judgment against a person who has
not been designated a party or served with process. Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793,798 (1996). Absent due process, a
court wields no power over an individual because a court only
acquires jurisdiction over a party through proper service of
15

process, which provides notice to the defendant that he is being
sued and that he must appear and defend himself. Myers v.
Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879,880 (Utah 1981). Although Duncan
et al. have clearly been aware of litigation swirling about them for
some time, they have never been called upon to defend their
interests in the manner afforded a defendant in a civil action.
5J32 BYU counters by insisting that Duncan et al. are not entitled
to be "true" defendants. They have little or no personal interest in the
outcome of this case, BYU claims, and thus are owed a
correspondingly small amount of due process. BYU essentially argues
that Duncan et al. have been mere caretakers of SoftSolutions1
property and as such are entitled to process no greater than BYU's
judgment debtor, SoftSolutions.
5J33 BYU specifically argues that Duncan et al. were part of an
unincorporated association with SoftSolutions and therefore the court
may disregard the corporate forms of the various entities controlled by
Duncan et al. This would mean that, for debt collection purposes,
Duncan et. al are the functional equivalent of SoftSolutions and are
therefore liable for the SoftSolutions judgment debt. According to
BYU, Duncan et al. are not newcomers to the court, entitled to the full
spectrum of due process, but mere stand-ins for SoftSolutions-an
entity which has already received due process. Alternatively, BYU
argues that several legal theories lead to the conclusion that Duncan et
al. are merely possessors, and not owners, of SoftSolutions' property.
Thus they have no legal interest in the outcome of this action and are
not entitled to any amount of due process.
J34 Under the two presuppositions, BYU posits Duncan et al.
sustained no shortfall of due process for two reasons: (1) the district
judge remedied any due process shortcomings when he provided
SoftSolutions and Duncan et al. a hearing on their motions to vacate,
alter, and/or amend the July 2002 supplemental order and (2) Duncan
et al. were not entitled to due process because BYU was simply
pursuing property of SoftSolutions that could be traced to Duncan et
al.
5J35 We have already rejected BYUfs first justification on the
grounds that the hearing on Duncan et al.'s rule 59 motion took
place in an environment in which critical considerations-like
16

burden of proof-were distorted to the advantage of BYU. Duncan
et al. were entitled at a minimum to a forum in which BYU was
obliged to carry its burden of proof on the merits of its theories,
which supposedly extended liability to Duncan et al. Duncan et al.
were never presented this opportunity.
5J36 We will take up BYU's second justification in the context of
the legal theories advanced by BYU to extend liability for the
SoftSolutions judgment to Duncan et al. Of particular relevance to our
inquiry is whether BYU's legal theories could be pursued through the
judgment debt collection procedures set out in 69(s) of our Rules of
Civil Procedure, which appears to permit a judgment creditor to reach
the assets of persons not named as parties to the lawsuit that yielded
the judgment.
5137 Property in the possession of an unnamed party to a
lawsuit may fall prey to a judgment creditor under two general
principles. The first focuses on the relationship between the
judgment debtor and the non-party target of the collection action.
Where the identities of debtor and the third party merge in the
eyes of the law, liability for the judgment may extend to the third
party. Alter ego and allied rationales for disregarding the corporate
form are the most prominent examples of legal doctrines of this type.
The second principle directs its attention to the character of the
target property. An action which alleges that a judgment debtor
has fraudulently transferred property to a third party is an
example of a circumstance in which the destination of property
rather than the identity of parties results in an extension of
liability beyond the named judgment debtor. However, we are
aware of no cause of action derived from either principle that can
be enforced against an unnamed party in a post-judgment
collection action.
5f38 Alter ego is a common law doctrine deeply rooted in our
corporate law jurisprudence. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand Canyon
Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, 84P.3d 1154: Amoss v. Bennion, 420
R2d47,48 18 (Utah 1966); In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595
(Utah 1953). Our legislature has codified the law governing
fraudulent transfers, providing detailed and comprehensive
guidance regarding both substantive elements of fraudulent
17

transfers and procedural prerequisites, such as a statute of
limitations specific to fraudulent transfers.
3J39 IN LIGHT OF THE STATUS CONFERRED THROUGH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATIVE
ACTION UPON ALTER EGO AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, IT IS
APPARENT THAT A CLAIM FOUNDED ON EITHER THEORY IS A
CIVIL ACTION THAT MUST BE PROSECUTED IN THE MANNER
PRESCRIBED IN THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE^.
COMMENCING WITH THE FILING OF A SUMMONS AND
COMPLAINT AND NOT THE ABBREVIATED POST-JUDGMENT
COLLECTION PROCEDURES OF RULE 69. McBride-Williams v.
Huard, 2004 UT 21, 94 P.3d 175 (stating that a civil action is
commenced under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by
filing a complaint with the court or by serving a summons on the
defendant with a copy of the complaint).
5J40 Such a cause of action must then be prosecuted in a civil
action commenced by the filing of a complaint and including the
right of a defendant to receive service of process, conduct
discovery, enjoy the protections afforded by a trial-including a
j u r y trial and the allocation of the burden of proof-and the right
to appeal. Duncan et al. never received these protections.
5J41 While the failure of a party in a civil action to comply with
one or more of the rules of civil procedure will not necessarily result
in a constitutional deprivation of due process, a violation of due
process does occur if a court permits a cause of action that should
properly be prosecuted as a civil action to proceed under those
rules promulgated to assist in the collection efforts of a judgment
creditor.
J42 As we have noted, the full measure of process is not due
everyone. Once a judgment has been entered against a party, he is
exposed to a deprivation of his property with few opportunities to
object or seek judicial intervention on his behalf. An opportunity for
due process mischief arises when a judgment creditor attempts to
utilize collection procedures to acquire property that is not in the
control of the judgment debtor or in which a non-party claims an
interest. These circumstances almost inevitably invite a conflict
between the rights of the judgment creditor, who believes that he is
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entitled to have his judgment satisfied with dispatch, and the target of
the execution, who likely believes otherwise. This conflict is on
display here.
5J43 Although B YU never asserted a claim of alter ego against
Duncan et al., it persuaded the district court that it should disregard
the corporate form of SoftSolutions. The district court extend
individual liability to Duncan et al. under the provisions of rule 17(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which renders associates in an
unincorporated business association liable for a judgment entered
against the association. In Tremco, we held that rule 17(d) is not
substantive in nature and does not create a cause of action which
could result in the imposition of personal liability. Based on this
interpretation of rule 17(d), we reversed the district court extension of
liability to Tremco on rule 17(d) grounds. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, J 18.
We reaffirm that interpretation today and reverse the district court's
use of rule 17(d) to justify imposing liability for the SoftSolutions
judgment on Duncan et al. in the July 2002 supplemental order.
3J44 The district court also attempted to rely on rule 69(s) to justify
its determination that BYU was entitled to recover its SoftSolutions
judgment from Duncan et al. This provision, since repealed, permitted
the court to "order any property of a judgment debtor, not exempt
from execution, in the possession of the debtor or other person, or due
to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(s) (2002).
5f45 The premise that underlay this grant ot authority to execute
against property in the possession of someone other than the judgment
debtor is that the targeted property was, in fact, property belonging to
the judgment debtor. Rule 69(h)(1) recognized the possibility that the
party who held the property subject to execution might object to the
execution and extended to him the right to challenge the validity of
the writ of execution. This provision was not intended, however, to
provide an alternative form of summary adjudication of claims that
would otherwise be required to be prosecuted as civil actions. Thus, to
the extent that the district court grounded its extension of liability to
Duncan et al. in the July 2002 supplemental order on a theory of
fraudulent transfer or alter ego, those rulings are in error because each
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constitutes a cause of action cognizable at law or equity subject to the
full array of due process associated with a civil action.
5J46 BYU's final theory for extending liability to Duncan et al. is
one based upon Utah Code section 16-10a-1408 and is likewise not
amenable to adjudication in a summary collection proceeding. Section
16-10a-1408 provides that "[a] claim [against a dissolved corporation]
may be enforced . .. against the shareholders of the dissolved
corporation, if the assets have been distributed in liquidation." Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 (2005). This provision codifies the
equitable theory known as the "trust fund" doctrine. 19 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 2419 (1986). Under this theory, the "assets of a
dissolved corporation become a trust fund against which the
corporation's creditors have a claim." Id.
5147 Contrary to BYUfs preferred interpretation, section 16-10a1408 does not authorize the enforcement of claims in a summary
collection proceeding. In fact, the use of supplemental collection
procedures is expressly rejected in section 16-10a- 1407(4)(b). This
provision directs the enforcement of a claim against a shareholder of a
dissolved corporation to be pursued in "any civil action." As discussed
above, a civil action means a proceeding subject to the full spectrum
of due process safeguards. We do not believe that the legislature
intended, or that our constitution would permit, an enforcement
proceeding against a non-party shareholder to take place in the setting
of a post-judgment collection effort.
CONCLUSION
5J48 Having concluded that Duncan et al. were denied due process
of law, we vacate the July 2002 supplemental order. Although we also
hold that the district court erred when it denied Duncan et al.'s motion
to intervene and to vacate, alter, and/or amend the July 2002
supplemental order, by vacating the supplemental order, we have
extinguished any proceeding which may merit remand and the need
for intervention by Duncan et al.
... (Emphasis added.)
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Paragraphs 38 through 41 of that decision are dispositive of this appeal.
Appellees have a fraudulent transfer claim against APS and have not commenced a
legal action against APS, and instead have violated APS due process rights by
having that claim adjudicated in a summary collection proceeding.
2. The Statute of Limitations was raised sufficiently in the context
of this case.
The statute of limitations was raised at the only time it was possible to do so. In
the June 30, 2007 hearing, at pages 143-44, the following occurred:
24
As to whether or not adequate notice has been
25
given, one of the defenses available to that is the statute
Page: 144
1
of limitations. APS has never been hailed into court, and
2
they've got a defense. There's been plenty of years come
3
and go involving that conveyance and APS is not in front of
4
the court today. No one has hailed them into court to
5
challenge that. And until they do so, this is a theoretical
6
argument at best and, therefore, this sale, should it go
7
forward, will have the detriment of harming both the
8
plaintiff and the defendant with none of the benefit to
9
anyone that's involved in these proceedings that execution
10
should envision.
11
Therefore, I think, substantively, the objection
12
because there are other folks who have interests in this
13
property require the Court not to allow the sheriffs sale to
14
go forward. And if they want to try and rectify all of the
15
issues involved in that, then they need to bring a suit
16
against APS, MPI and others.
In that same hearing, APS pointed out that APS was not on notice of anything
that Plaintiffs' were doing at that hearing, as follows:
22
23
24

Anything else, Mr. Willardson, that I should know?
MR. WILLARDSON: If Mr. Snuffer is finished, yes.
I you told me I'd have a chance to address this lack of
21

25
due process that we're getting here.
Page: 164
1
Mr. Olson incorporated his brief by reference. We
2
were not a party to that briefing, never had a chance to do
3
it. We didn't get the statutes that he was arguing before
4
closing arguments today. We didn't get this case before
5
closing argument today. We were not party to any writs, we
6
were not we have not had a chance to know what was heard.
7
But even so, even though I'm looking down this for
8
the first time, I can see problems that, had we been on
9
notice, that the Court could have been apprised of. The
10
claim arising before the transfer, that doesn't even apply
11
here because this claim arose back in 2001, and the contract
12
was that testified all the things occurred at the first
13
part of 2003, and I don't know exactly when these claimants
14
got their judgment, but it was after that. I do know that.
15
So this is something that was done before; you've got to
16
have both.
17
The lack of equivalent value and the debtor
18
insolvent, if we had done nothing here today because
19
Mr. Olson has put on no evidence the tie doesn't go to the
20
runner here; he has to do something to prove his case, and
21
he hasn't. But we have done things. We have shown that
22
there was that there was value that was provided. And
23
he he thinks that the IRS thing takes care of everything.
24
But he can't have it both ways. If the property was worth
25
$3 million, maybe they weren't insolvent. Maybe they were
Page: 165
1
solvent at that time. That's his burden. He hasn't shown
2
that. And we haven't had a fair chance to contest it.
The fact that plaintiffs/Appellees now claim APS has not 'done enough' to
preserve the issue on appeal again illustrates that APS has not had a full and fair
opportunity to be heard.
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3. Appellees' arguments about the 'sufficiency7 of the findings are
both irrelevant and logically fallacious.
Plaintiffs/Appellees' argument about the lower court satisfying the elements of
fraudulent transfer is both irrelevant and circular. The argument is irrelevant
because Appellant's argument is not that the judgment as written did not cover
every aspect of the statute under which plaintiffs were proceeding, it was that the
judgment could only do that by placing the burden of proof on APS, which is an
error of law. The argument of Appellees is circular because it uses the "findings"
to prove that the "findings" are proper. That is an error of logic.
In addition, Plaintiffs/Appellees have raised a red herring with their argument
on marshaling of evidence. APS's argument is that the court below placed the
burden of proof on the wrong party. As was set forth in APS's first brief, the
standard applicable here, "clear and convincing evidence" leaves no room for
serious and substantial doubt. The fact that the lower court ignored all of the direct
evidence and based its decision exclusively on inference and argument is a
demonstration that the burden was placed upon APS, rather than on
Plaintiffs/Appellees. It is not an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is an
exposition of an error of law. Marshalling of facts is not required in such a
situation. As was stated in Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah CA 1998):
Furthermore, application of a legal standard to undisputed facts
presents a question of law; thus, if the trial court erred in the standard
it applied, we may review the facts to determine whether they
nevertheless support the trial court's decision under the correct
standard.
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4. Carefully following the wrong legal model does not produce
correct results.
Judgments may be collected only from property that is owned, legally or
equitably, by a judgment debtor. Whether plaintiffs followed the format of the
collection statute is not at issue. Plaintiff/Appellees' argument that the paperwork
was correct under URCP 64E is therefore irrelevant. The issue is whether APS, as
the entity that owned the property, was given a full measure of due process, i.e., an
opportunity to know what the issues were, and present evidence and law that
protected its interests. APS was not given such an opportunity.
5. Appellees have not shown a legal basis for assessment of
attorney fees against APS.
Plaintiff/Appellees' last argument is that they should be awarded attorney fees
on appeal. The basis for that request is a statute that requires employees to "bring
suit" for wages. If Appellees had brought a civil action against APS, this appeal
would not exist. Appellees have acknowledged that they have not sued APS and
APS was not a party below. Therefore, the request for attorney fees is
inappropriate.

V, Conclusion and Relief Sought
The decision below is not in accordance with the applicable law and must be
reversed.
The decision below purports to take away APS's property rights and was
arrived at only by denying APS due process. It must, therefore, be reversed.
APS requests that the decision below be reversed, and that costs and fees
associated with this appeal be awarded to APS.
24

DATED: Tuesday, January 22, 2008.

Timothy Miguel Willardson
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